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THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF EURO-AREA MACRO-MODELLING
SHORTCUTS
by Libero Monteforte∗ and Stefano Siviero∗
Abstract
Should euro-area economies be modelled in an aggregate (area-wide) fashion or in a
disaggregate (multi-country) one? This paper tackles that question from both a statistical and
an economic viewpoint. From a statistical viewpoint, aggregation bias criteria are found to
signal that the degree of structural heterogeneity among euro-area economies is such that the
loss of information entailed by an aggregate modelling approach may be far from trifling. From
an economic viewpoint, we investigate the following issue: Are those statistically detectable
asymmetries of any practical relevance when it comes to supporting monetary policy decision-
making? To provide an answer to this question, we compute optimal monetary policy reaction
functions on the basis of either an aggregate model or a disaggregate one, and compare the
associated welfare losses. The results suggest that the welfare under-performance of an area-
wide-model-based rule is not only non negligible, but also systematic, significant and robust
with respect to a number of sensitivity analyses.
JEL classification: C53, E52; Keywords: euro area, aggregation, monetary policy rules, robustness.
∗ Bank of Italy, Economic Research Department. Email: monteforte.libero@insedia.interbusiness.it;
stefano.siviero@bancaditalia.it.
Page 1 of 66
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
1
1. Introduction and main findings1
Following the introduction of the single currency in a number of European countries on
1st January 1999, a number of novel challenges had to be faced by European policymakers,
economic scholars and practitioners alike. Focussing on modelling challenges, monetary
policymaking for the euro area as a whole clearly requires that policy analyses and projections,
previously run on a country-by-country basis, be now extended to cover all economies in the
area in a consistent way. This raises the following basic issue: should the Eurozone economy
be modelled as if it was one single, large economy (area-wide, or aggregate, approach)? Or,
alternatively, should disaggregate country data be used to build inter-linked single-country
models (multi-country, or disaggregate, approach)?
In principle, aggregate models are sub-optimal whenever the individual units being
aggregated display some degree of heterogeneity. Most empirical studies of the euro-area
economy indicate that the extent of the divergences in the behaviour of the participating
economies —particularly as far as the monetary transmission mechanisms is concerned— is
far from being negligible: relevant asymmetries still exist, and they are likely to reflect deep
structural differences.2
Despite the wealth of evidence on the heterogeneity of euro-area economies, few
systematic efforts have been made to assess the statistical significance of that heterogeneity and
to test whether the modelling of aggregate euro-area data —as opposed to individual country
ones— is a sound econometric strategy. Furthermore, to our knowledge no attempt has been
made to tackle that issue from a policymaking viewpoint.
1 We thank participants in the CEPR-ZEI Conference “Empirical Models of the Euro Economy 2: Sec-
toral Aspects and Performance,” Bonn, 7-8 March 2003; participants in the Ecomod 2003 Conference, Istanbul,
3-5 July 2003; participants in the CFS Workshop “Empirical Methods for Bulding Macroeconomic Models,”
Deutsche Bundesbank, Eltville, 11-18 August 2003; and participants in workshops at the Banque de France and
University of Rome “La Sapienza” for many helpful comments and suggestions on previous versions of this
work. The usual disclaimers apply. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do necessarily
represent those of the Bank of Italy.
2 A (very) partial list of recent works that have a bearing on this issue includes Dornbusch, Favero and
Giavazzi (1998), Ramaswamy and Sloek (1997), Guiso, Kashyap, Panetta and Terlizzese (1999), Hughes Hallett
and Piscitelli (1999), Dedola and Lippi (2000), Clements, Kontolemis and Levy (2001), Ciccarelli and Rebucci
(2002), and the papers presented at a recent ECB conference (”Monetary Policy Transmission in the Euro Area”,
ECB, Frankfurt, 18-19 December 2001). Not much effort has yet been devoted to trying to identify the structural
determinants underlying the observed asymmetries. Fragmentary evidence may be found in van Els, Locarno,
Morgan and Villetelle (2001).
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2
This paper tackles the aggregate/disaggregate euro-area modelling trade-off from both a
statistical and an economic viewpoint.
From a statistical viewpoint, the greater parsimony and trasparency of aggregate models
usually comes at the cost of an aggregation bias. We therefore explore —using a number of
criteria and diagnostics proposed in the literature— whether signs of aggregation bias may
be detected in the estimates of a stylised model of the euro area, and assess the size of that
bias. We find that the empirical evidence consistently supports the conclusion that ignoring
the heterogeneity of euro-area countries entails a sizeable loss of information.
The core of the paper is the analysis of the aggregate/disaggregate trade-off from
an economic viewpoint: we propose a model-selection-criterion that relies on economic
arguments rather than statistical ones. We begin by observing that statistical evidence of
aggregation bias cannot per se be taken to imply that the use of aggregate econometric tools
would result in dramatically unreliable analyses and insight, and hence in markedly sub-
optimal economic decisions. To explore whether or not that would be the case, we assess
the performance of two hypothetical euro-area monetary policy-makers: the first relies on
an aggregate model of the euro area, while the second takes her decisions on the basis
of a disaggregate model, We then explore whether the performance of the former policy-
maker would be perceivably worse than that of the latter. Our approach may thus be
viewed as proposing a policy-based metric for assessing the economic relevance of structural
asymmetries across euro-area economies.3 Should this analysis suggest that no big welfare
losses are at stake, an area-wide modelling approach might remain the preferred option,
regardless of what the standard statistical checks of aggregation bias may indicate. Our
findings suggests that the additional welfare losses that would be incurred by relying on an
aggregate modelling approach (as opposed to a disaggregate one) may be far from trifling.
This conclusion, while obviously model-dependent, appears to be robust with respect to a
number of sensitivity analyses.
A few papers have addressed the aggregate/disaggregate trade-off in the context of
euro-area monetary policymaking from different angles: De Grauwe and Piskorski (2001)
and Aksoy, De Grauwe and Dewachter (2002) investigate the implications of nationalistic
3 From the viewpoint of the debate on robust rules (see the contributions in Taylor (1999) and, more recently,
Levin and Williams (2003)), the paper may be viewed as focussing on one particular type of robustness (i.e.,
robustness with respect to the assumption of aggregability).
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3
attitude of the ECB Governing Council members, and assess how the performance of euro-
area monetary policy is affected by changes in the definition of preferences (specifically, they
contrast loss functions defined over area-wide aggregates and loss functions that are weighted
averages of the individual national central banks’ ones). Angelini, Del Giovane, Siviero and
Terlizzese (2002) focus on the role that can be played by information at the national level
in setting the single monetary policy of the euro area, under the maintained assumption that
preferences are defined over area-wide aggregates. They find that, by reacting to national
information, the euro-area central bank attains significant reductions in (aggregate) inflation
and output variability, as opposed to the case in which the interest rate reacts to area-wide
variables only. This paper may thus be viewed as filling a gap in the literature, by focussing
on the implications of the aggregate/disaggregate trade-off on modelling-for-policy choices.
A question naturally arises here: Why there seems to be no comparable interest for
aggregation issues in the case of other monetary unions? The answer rests, we feel, with
the fact that heterogeneity among euro-area countries is widely presumed to be much more
pronounced than in other monetary unions or federal states (the US being the most obvious
comparison), largely because of differences in the institutional frameworks of participating
countries, which are expected to persist, at least to a certain extent, for some time into
the future. One is thus inclined to conjecture that the potential information loss associated
with using aggregate econometric tools is likely to be larger for the euro area than for other
economies.4
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 shortly describes the two basic modelling
options faced by euro-area modellers and presents and compares the main features of the
stylised aggregate and disaggregate models used in the remainder of the paper. Section 3
briefly presents the results of a number of aggregation bias tests and criteria. Section 4 presents
the approach followed to assess the economic relevance of structural heterogeneity across
euro-area countries. Section 5 offers a quantification of the additional welfare losses that
would be incurred if euro-area monetary policy was to rely on an aggregate model rather than
a disaggregate one, and investigates the model and rule features that result in those additional
losses. Section 6 provides an estimate of the significance of the additional losses and tests
4 However, significant regional differences in the transmission of monetary policy have been detected even
in the case of the US economy; see Carlino and DeFina (1998, 1999) and Owayang and Wall (2003).
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4
the robustness of the main results along various dimensions (how the results would likely be
affected should euro-area economies tend to converge in the future? Would the conclusions be
different if the competing rules were assumed to be forward-looking?). Section 6 concludes.
2. Aggregation bias testing in two simple models of the euro area
When it comes to building empirical tools for euro-area forecasting and policy analysis
purposes, two basic options are available: as a first alternative, one could build a disaggregate,
or multi-country, model, i.e., a model describing the functioning of the economic mechanisms
in the individual countries of the area and the inter-linkages amongst them; in such a model,
country-specific features may be reflected by either the structure of the model and/or the
value of its parameters. As a second, much less onerous, alternative, one may first aggregate
the individual country data5 and model the latter as if they referred to one single, large and
homogeneous economy (aggregate, or area-wide, model).6
In this paragraph we describe the two (aggregate and disaggregate) simple AS-AD
models used in the remainder of this paper and present their main properties. Several variants
of models of the same kind as the ones we consider have been widely used in the literature
on optimal policy rule; see Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) for a strictly backward-looking
version and Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999) for a fully forward-looking one. Both models
presented below are purely backward-looking and are thus potentially affected by the issue
of policy-dependent parameters (Lucas Critique).7 However, the issue we investigate is
essentially an empirical one, and the European monetary policy-maker largely relies on models
belonging to the same broad family as the ones we use here (see ECB (2001)), so that our rules
are derived within a modelling framework similar to that underlying actual monetary policy
5 Labhard, Weeken andWestaway (2001) argue that the actual choice of the aggregating function is unlikely
to affect the properties of the model in any significant way. The aggregating functions used in this paper are briefly
described below.
6 Both approaches are being pursued in practice, even by the same institutions. For instance, the European
Central Bank (ECB) maintains an aggregate model (see Fagan, Henry and Mestre (2001)) and is in the process
of building a disaggregate one. Also, the euro-area projections by the Eurosystem (the institution comprising the
ECB and the national central banks of euro-area countries) are the result of a multi-staged process that involves
aggregating country-specific projections while also using information derived from the ECB’s area-wide model,
to come to one single, consistent picture (see ECB (2001)).
7 Lucas (1976). See, however, Sims (1982), Farmer (1991), Hendry (1988), Favero and Hendry (1992) and
Altissimo, Siviero and Terlizzese (2002) for a number of arguments that mitigate the implications of the Lucas
Critique.
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decisions. Moreover, the empirical evidence presented below overwhelmingly supports the
hypothesis of structural stability, even for the most recent period, when, arguably, a major
shock occured in the policy regime. Finally, using one of the models presented below,
Angelini, Del Giovane, Siviero and Terlizzese (2002) show that the relevance of disaggregate
information for euro-area monetary policymaking is robust with respect to the presence of
forward-looking elements, as long as these are not dominant.
The Aggregate Euro Area Model (AEAM) is a simple two-equation model estimated
using aggregate data for the three largest economies in the euro area (Germany, France and
Italy, jointly accounting for over 70 per cent of the area GDP). It includes an aggregate supply
equation (also referred to as Phillips curve) and an aggregate demand equation (also referred
to as IS curve). The first equation determines inflation as a function of lagged inflation and the
output gap; the sum of the coefficients on lagged inflation is constrained to unit (the restriction
cannot be rejected), so that the Phillips curve is of the accelerationist type. The second equation
relates the output gap to its own lagged values and the real interest rate.8
A general-to-specific modelling approach was followed in searching for a satisfactory
empirical specification, starting with 6 lags for all variables on the right-hand-side of the two
equations. The final specification is the following:
πt+1 = α1πt + (1− α1)πt−3 + ηyt + ut+1
yt+1 = θyt + ψ(it−1 − 4 · πt−1) + vt+1
where πt+1 is the quarter-on-quarter consumer inflation rate; yt+1 is the output gap; it+1 is the
short-term interest rate; it+1−k − 4 · πt+1−k = rt+1 is a measure of the ex-post real interest
rate.9
8 Neither equation includes foreign variables; in other words, the euro area is modelled as a closed economy,
similarly to what is invariably done for the US. Note that the degree of openess of the euro area as a whole is
similar to that of the US.
9 The source of data is the ESA-95 National Accounts for inflation and the output gap, and the BIS data-bank
for the short-term interest rate. Inflation is measured by the quarter-on-quarter rate of change of the (seasonally
adjusted) households’ consumption deflator. Potential output was estimated by applying a band-pass filter (Baxter
and King (1995)) to the (log) GDP, selecting frequency components of 32 quarters and higher, with a truncation
of 16 quarters. National variables were aggregated using a fixed-weight procedure. For inflation, 1999 PPP
consumer spending shares were used. For the output gap, the weights are given by 1999 PPP real GDP shares.
For interest rates, the weights are the PPP nominal GDP shares computed by the OECD. The GDP and consumer
spending weights are, respectively 0.43 and 0.44 for Germany, 0.29 and 0.27 for France, 0.28 and 0.29 for Italy.
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6
The model was estimated with SURE, thus allowing for the possibility of correlation
between the residuals of the two equations. The sample period extends from 1978.Q1 to
1998.Q4, totalling 84 quarterly observations. The estimation results are presented in Table 1.
The Disaggregate Euro Area Model (DEAM) includes, for each of the three largest euro-
area countries, the same set of equations as the AEAM. The specification of both the aggregate
supply and the aggregate demand equation is similar to the one adopted in the AEAM but, in
addition, it allows for cross-country linkages. Specifically, in the AS equation inflation in any
given country depends not only on its own lagged values and on the corresponding output gap,
but also, at least in principle, on inflation “imported” from the other two countries (inflation
imported from either country is given, in estimation, by the sum of inflation in that country
and the rate of change of the relevant bilateral exchange rate). Analogously to the case of the
AEAM, the sum of the coefficients on lagged and imported inflation is constrained to be 1 (the
restriction is accepted by the data for all countries). Similarly, in the AD equation the output
gap in any of the three countries depends on its own lagged values and on the corresponding
real interest rate, as in the AEAM; in addition, it may react to the output gap in the other two
countries, reflecting trade linkages.10
As the model set-up allows for instantaneous cross-country linkages, 3SLS were used
to estimate its parameters. The sample period extends from 1978.Q1 to 1998.Q4, as for the
AEAM. For most of the sample period, the exchange rates among Germany, France and Italy,
though constrained by the ERM of the EMS, were not fixed; lagged values of all variables
included in the model were used as instruments for the exchange rates.11 As to interest rates,
we assume that they affect the output gap only with a lag (which, incidentally, is consistent with
most empirical evidence): 3SLS estimation could hence be carried out without augmenting the
estimated model with interest rate reaction functions for the three countries.
10 Real exchange rate terms were found to be non significant and were dropped in the final specification.
11 In the experiments presented below, the percentage change of the exchange rate was set identically equal
to zero, consistently with the introduction of the single currency as of January 1, 1999.
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7
The general form of the two-equation sub-model for country j is the following:12
πjt+1 =
pX
k=1
αj,kπ
j
t+1−k +
X
i6=j
pX
k=0
βj,i,k(πit+1−k+
.
e
i,j
t+1−k) +
pX
k=0
ηj,ky
j
t+1−k + u
j
t+1
yjt+1 =
pX
k=1
θj,ky
j
t+1−k +
X
i6=j
pX
k=0
ϕj,i,kyit+1−k +
pX
k=1
ψj,k(i
j
t+1−k − 4 · πjt+1−k) + vjt+1
where: J = G,F, I denotes country variables and
.
e
i,j
t+1−k is the quarter-on-quarter rate of
change of the exchange rate between country i and country j (units of country j’s currency for
1 unit of country i’s currency).
The starting specification included on the right-hand-side of each estimated equation the
first 6 lags of all relevant variables. Joint estimation of the three sub-models resulted, after
dropping all insignificant lags, in a much more parsimonious specification (see Table 2, where
the exchange rates have been omitted, as they play no role in the version of the model used in
Section 4 to identify optimal policy rules).
Both models were re-estimated with data up to 1996.Q4, so as to make a reasonably
sized sample (20 quarterly observations, from 1997.Q1 to 2001.Q4) available for stability
testing. The resulting parameter estimates are virtually unchanged with respect to those found
with the original sample. For both models, the empirical evidence overwhelmingly rejects the
hypothesis of parameter instability (the tail probability of the relative F-test is always larger
than 50 per cent). Interestingly, the cross-country dispersion of all DEAM parameters but one
is actually slightly higher with the full sample estimates.
The impulse responses of both models —obtained by simulating the AEAM and DEAM
augmented with the same Taylor-type stabilizing policy rule; see Monteforte and Siviero
(2003)— are broadly in line with well-established stylized facts about the euro-area economy.13
In particular: (i) any shock tends to result in remarkably persistent deviations from the
12 In keeping with the approach followed in similar literature, neither the AEAM nor the DEAM that we
use for our experiments below include any constant terms, i.e., it may be taken to provide a description of the
functioning of the euro area economy in the neighborhood of equilibrium. This amounts to implicitly assuming
that the same equilibrium values apply to all countries, a condition that does not necessarily hold in the sample
period, particularly regarding the (implied) equilibrium real interest rates.
13 See, e.g., the evidence presented at the Conference “Monetary Policy Transmission in the Euro Area”,
ECB, Frankfurt, 18-19 December 2001.
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equilibrium; (ii) a monetary policy shock initially affects output more than inflation; (iii) the
full response of output and inflation to an interest rate shock takes some time to materialize.
The general pattern of most impulse responses is similar in the two models. However,
a few relevant differences are apparent: (i) deviations from the equilibrium tend to be more
pronounced and persistent in the DEAM; (ii) while the maximum effect on output occurrs,
in both models, about one year after the shock, the maximum effect of inflation is somewhat
delayed in the DEAM; (iii) the effects of monetary policy on inflation are stroger in the DEAM,
while the opposite holds for the output gap; (iv) because of the generally more pronounced
impact of aggregate supply and aggregate demand shocks in the DEAM, monetary policy
tends to be more activist than in the AEAM, even if both models are augmented with exactly
the same Taylor-type rule.
Finally, there is some indirect evidence supporting the conjecture that the results
presented in this paper would likely be broadly confirmed if similar analyses were performed
with some of the main models of the euro area developed and maintained by policymaking
and economic analysis institutions.14 First, virtually all models in use with other institutions
signal the existence of a significant degree of heterogeneity among the three largest economies
in the euro area; this is crucial for our argument, as lack of heterogeneity would by definition
entail that there is no value added in using a disaggr gate model instead of an aggregate one.
Second, the differences in the features of the DEAM and AEAM as highlighted by the analysis
of impulse responses above are remarkably similar to the differences found when the IMF’s
Multimod Mark III (disaggregate) model is compared with its aggregate version (Mark IIIb).15
For instance, both comparisons indicate that the effects of a monetary policy shock on output
are initially stronger in the aggregate models (AEAM and Mark III) than in the corresponding
disaggregate ones (DEAM and Mark IIIb); by contrast, the effects on inflation are sensibly
more pronounced in the disaggregate models than in the aggregate ones. Discounting for the
differences in the experimental design, even the size of the differences between the reaction of
the AEAM and that of the DEAM is similar to what one finds when the Mark IIIb and Mark III
14 Specifically, Monteforte and Siviero (2003) consider the following models: the ECB’s Area Wide Model
(Fagan, Henry and Mestre (2001); Dieppe and Henry (2002)); the IMF’s Mark III (disaggregate) and Mark IIIb
(aggregate) (Hunt and Laxton (2002)); the European Commission’s Quest (Roeger and in’t Veld (2002)); the
National Institute’s NiGem (Barrell, Gottschalk, Hurst and Welsum (2002)).
15 The IMF models largely share the theoretical underpinnings and empirical modelling approach, so that
any differences between them may be interpreted as largely stemming from what the data themselves indicate.
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9
models are compared. The salient features that emerge from the comparison of our aggregate
and disaggregate models are thus confirmed if other modelling set-ups are examined.
3. Direct aggregation bias investigation
Analysis of aggregation bias dates back to Theil’s seminal work of 1954. In that
set-up, the aggregation bias vanishes, under the assumption that both the aggregate and
disaggregate equations are correctly specified, in only two cases: (i) micro homogeneity (i.e.,
when the parameters of any disaggregate equation are identical to those of any other); (ii)
compositional stability (i.e., when the ratio between each disaggregate exogenous variable
and the corresponding aggregate one is constant over time). If none of those two conditions
hold, the aggregate relationship will have an additional error component as compared with
the disaggregate ones; such additional components is what Theil (1954) labelled “aggregation
bias”.
The most natural criterion to assess the relevance of the aggregation bias consists of
comparing the sum of squared residuals associated with the disaggregate equations with that
of the aggregate one, as first proposed by Grunfeld and Griliches (1960). Pesaran, Pierse
and Kumar (1989) proposed a slightly different criterion, which corrects for small sample
bias in the sum of square residuals. The criterion consists of comparing the aggregate and
(modified) disaggregate standard errors.16 If the micro equations are correctly specified, the
latter is necessarily smaller than or at most equal to the former by construction. However,
the opposite may well happen in practice if the equations that are compared are affected by
misspecification errors.
Monteforte (2003) developed an Factor-Analysis-based approach for aggregation bias
testing. In short, that approach rests on identifying the idiosyncratic components of the micro
equations: intuitively, the larger those components, the less appropriate the assumption of
aggregability.
16 In addition to proposing the criterion presented in the text, Pesaran, Pierse and Kumar (1989) also derived
a formal test for aggregation bias. A drawback of that test is that it may be computed only when the number of
micro units is relatively large (this condition is not satisfied in the empirical application of this paper).
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Finally, Zellner and Tobias (2000) and Baltagi, Griffin and Xiong (2000) have advocated
assessing the relevance of the aggregation bias on the basis of the relative forecast performance
of the aggregate and disaggregate models.
In the case at hand, all those criteria and tests consistently point in the direction of
rejecting the hypothesis of no aggregation bias.
Grunfeld and Griliches’s (1960) and Pesaran, Pierse and Kumar’s (1989) criteria for
the AEAM and DEAM are shown in Table 3. Clear signs of aggregation bias emerge on
the basis of both criteria, particularly in the case of the aggregate supply (Phillips Curve)
equations. Analogous indications are provided by the criteria based on factor models (Table
4): the idiosyncratic components of the disaggregate equations are far from trifling. Finally, the
results displayed in Table 5 shows that the hypothesis that the DEAM forecast-encompasses
the AEAM cannot be rejected in the case of the Phillips Curve equations, while the results are
mixed for the aggregate demand equations (Table 5).
Our results are consistent with those of Mayes and Virén (2000), who find that
asymmetries across euro-area aggregate supply curves are very pronounced; Fabiani and
Morgan (2003) also find some evidence of asymmetry of Phillips curves. By contrast, Fagan
and Henry (1999) find that the aggregate euro area money demand equation is basically
unaffected by aggregation bias.
To sum up, all available evidence indicates —although with different degrees of
“sharpness”— that the hypothesis of no aggregation bias cannot be accepted, especially in
the case of the aggregate supply equations.
4. Indirect aggregation bias investigation: Design of experiment
In the light of the results of the previous section, a disaggregate modelling approach of
the euro area appears to be statistically sounder than its alternative. It remains to be ascertained
whether it is also preferable from an economic viewpoint. To do this, we compare the
performance of two hypothetical European monetary policy-makers. The first policy-maker
is assumed to react to the state of the economy as represented by the AEAM; by contrast, the
second policy-maker’s optimal reaction is computed on the basis of the DEAM.
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Since the vector of state variables is different for the two models, the corresponding
optimal instrument rules (i.e., rules that exploit all the information provided by the whole set
of state variables, which we label FO rules) would not be easily comparable. We thus impose
that both rules belong to the Taylor-type family (i.e., the arguments of both rules are the current
area-wide inflation and output gap and the lagged value of the policy instrument only); for the
sake of making the comparison as fair as possible, we further require that the DEAM-based
rule (henceforth, DEAMBR) only respond to area-wide aggregates, as is necessarily the case
for the AEAM-based rule (AEAMBR).17
A standard time-separable quadratic loss function is assumed, its arguments being the
euro area average inflation rate and output gap, and a term that attaches a cost to the volatility
of the policy instrument; i.e.:
Lt = Et
∞X
τ=0
δτ [π2t+τ + λ · y2t+τ + µ · (∆it+τ )2](1)
where δ is a discount factor, and λ and µ are parameters that reflect the policy-maker’s
preferences; πt is the (euro-area average) year-on-year consumer inflation rate (i.e., πt =
πt + πt−1 + πt−2 + πt−3). Note that eq. (1) implies that the euro-area policy-maker is only
interested in euro-area average outcomes, in line with the official Eurosystem’s view of the
monetary policy objective and strategy.
For δ → 1 the sum in eq. (1) may be interpreted as the unconditional mean of the period
loss function (see, e.g., Rudebusch and Svensson (1999)), which is given by the weighted sum
of the unconditional variances of the target variables:
Lt = var[πt] + λ · var[yt] + µ · var[∆it](2)
In the following we adopt the loss function defined as in eq.(2). The search for optimal
policy was repeated with a wide range of values for λ and µ, ranging from a case in which
the monetary policy-maker is only interested in inflation (λ = µ = 0) to the opposite extreme,
in which the policy-maker attaches a comparatively very high cost to deviations of the output
17 The performance of rules that allow the policy-maker to respond to country-specific variables is investi-
gated in Angelini, Del Giovane, Siviero and Terlizzese (2002).
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gap from its equilibrium value (zero) and to the volatility of the policy-controlled interest rate
(λ = 5, µ = 3).18
The two competing rules may thus be synthetically described as follows:
AEAMBR
min
γA1 ,γA2 ,γA3
Et
P∞
τ=0 Lt+τ = minγA1 ,γA2 ,γA3
Et
P∞
τ=0[π2t+τ + λ · y2t+τ + µ · (∆it+τ )2]
s.to: • AEAM (see Section 2)
• it = γA1 · πt + γA2 · yt + γA3 · it−1
and:
DEAMBR
min
γM1 ,γM2 ,γM3
Et
P∞
τ=0 Lt+τ = minγM1 ,γM2 ,γM3
Et
P∞
τ=0[π2t+τ + λ · y2t+τ + µ · (∆it+τ )2]
s.to: • DEAM (see Section 2)
• it = γM1 · πt + γM2 · yt + γM3 · it−1
Let us now tackle the crucial issue of how the performance of these two rules may be
compared. The statistical evidence presented in Section 3 clearly indicates that the DEAM
provides a more reliable description of the functioning of the euro-area economy than the
AEAM. Accordingly, we assess, using the DEAM and the corresponding variance-covariance
matrix of residuals, the welfare function values associated with the optimised AEAM-based
and DEAMBRs computed as described above.
Given the way in which the two rules are compared, it is obviously the case that
the AEAMBR cannot outperform the DEAMBR by construction. However, the under-
performance of the AEAM could well be trifling. Our results below, by contrast, suggest that
the “welfare distance” between the two rules is non-negligible, and that it is significant. Also,
robustness checks are presented in Section 6 that investigate how the main results change if
the assumption that the DEAM provides a fully reliable description of the euro-area economy
is relaxed.
18 The ranges chosen for the loss function parameters are similar to the ones typically assumed in the litera-
ture; see, e.g., the papers collected in Taylor (1999).
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As a benchmark, we also compute, on the basis of the DEAM, the FO rule and the
associated optimised target variances and welfare loss.19 This third set of results is used to
compare the gains attainable with the DEAMBR with the (larger) ones that could be achieved
by relying on the rule that, by definition, performs best within the DEAM.
5. Main results
The main results of our experiments are shown in Figures 1 and 2 and Table 6. Let
us focus first on the outcomes of the two competing rules (Figure 1). The top chart of
the figure reports the percentage increase in the optimized value of the objective function
if the AEAMBR is followed instead of the DEAM-based one. The welfare losses are far
from negligible, being smallest (10 per cent) in the neighborhood of pure inflation targeting,
excluding, however, the latter case: in the case of pure inflation targeting, the AEAMBR does
not actually succeed in stabilizing the DEAM, thus resulting in an explosive unconditional
variance-covariance matrix, so that the welfare loss due to following the AEAMBR is in
principle infinite. The loss is consistently large if the weight of interest rate smoothing in
the loss function is zero, and exceeds 20 per cent if the weights of either the output gap or
the volatility of the policy instrument are relatively high. The key message given by the figure
is that ignoring the structural differences among the euro area economies, and so adopting
a model that treats them as a single and homogeneous “whole,” tends to lead to a sizeable
worsening of the performance of monetary policy, particularly if the policy-maker only cares
about inflation.
The bottom chart of Figure 1 reports the same results in relative terms, using the FO rule
as a benchmark;20 the chart suggests that an hypothetical policy-maker relying on the AEAM
would go a long way towards further worsening the distance (measured in terms of welfare)
between the DEAM-based and the FO rules. In particular, for µ = 0 the AEAMBR implies an
additional loss comprised between almost 25 and over 50 per cent of the loss that is incurred if
the DEAM-based, rather than the FO, rule is followed. Thus, not only is the size of the gains
19 For this purpose, we first derive the state-space representation of the DEAM, and then solve a standard
stochastic linear regulator problem (see Chow (1970), Sargent (1987), and, for an application to the issue of
optimal monetary policy design, Rudebusch and Svensson (1999)).
20 The FO rule differs from either of the other two, in that the arguments of the rule are the current and lagged
quarter-on-quarter country-specific inflation rates, rather than the average year-on-year inflation rates.
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that can be attained with a multi-country modelling approach not negligible, but, adopting the
true optimum rule as a benchmark, those gains are considerable.
The results can be assessed directly in terms of the optimised unconditional standard
deviations of inflation, the output gap and interest rate changes. This is done in Figure 2,
showing the optimal inflation/output gap frontier (in terms of optimized standard deviations
of those variables) for the AEAM-based, DEAM-based and FO rules. The frontiers have
been computed, for given µ, by letting λ take a grid of values between 0 (north-west) and 5
(south-east). While the frontier associated with the FO rule is positioned considerably to the
south-west with respect to the frontier associated with the DEAMBR, the latter consistently
attains a combination of inflation and output gap volatility that is much better than that of the
AEAMBR.
Can one trace these outcomes back to the properties of the different optimal rules, and in
particular to the optimised parameters on inflation, the output gap and the lagged interest rate
in the monetary policy reaction functions? A selection of the latter are presented in Table 6.21
At least one feature is noteworthy in that table: the AEAMBR is consistently not “reactive”
enough to either inflation or the output gap compared with the other two rules.
Further insight on the nature of the two rules is provided by “Fault tolerance analysis,”
as proposed by Levin and Williams (2003). Figure 3 shows the increase in the welfare loss
that arises as the parameters of the policy rules move away from the optimal ones. The results
suggest that the degrees of fault tolerance of the two rules are not markedly dissimilar, alrhough
the DEAMBR is somewhat more tolerant. By contrast, the results are heavily affected by the
loss function weights: specifically, the degree of fault tolerance declines sharply, for all rules
and for all parameters, as the weights of the output gap and the interest rate volatility increase.
21 Since the arguments of the FO rule are the quarter-on-quarter inflation rates, as opposed to the year-on-year
inflation rates of the AEAM- and DEAM-based rules, the latter were re-computed, for the purpose of compiling
Table 6, under the assumption that the policy rate reacts to quarterly inflation and aims at stabilizing annualised
quarter-on-quarter inflation. Thus, the FO, AEAM-based and DEAM-based rules reported in Table 6 are fully
comparable. Also note that the FO rule depends on the complete set of the 15 state variables in the DEAM: the
latter set comprises inflation and output gap in the various countries for different lags. For ease of comparison,
the coefficient on inflation reported in Table 6 is given, for the FO rule, by the sum of the value of all coefficients
that the rule assigns to inflation in all countries and for all lags; similarly for the output gap.
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6. Robustness checks
The results above suggest that the under-performance of the rule that relies on the
aggregate model are prima-facie far from trifling. We now investigate whether those results are
also significant; we also examine what would be the consequences of structural convergence
of euro area economies; finally, we consider the possibility that the rules be forward-looking.
To test whether the welfare distance between the two rules is significant (which, as far
as we know, has never been addressed in the literature on optimal monetary rules), we perform
two stochastic simulation exercises.
The first exercise consists of extracting 1,000 replications from the set of estimated
residuals and simulating the DEAM, for each replication, under either one or the other of
the two competing rules.22 The results show that the DEAMBR delivers a better outcome than
the alternative in the overwhelming majority of replications (always at least 80 per cent; see the
top chart of Figure 4). Hence, not only is the gain large on average, but is also systematic. We
also formally tested the hypothesis that the average welfare loss associated with following the
DEAMBR is lower than the average loss with the AEAMBR.23 The results are overwhelmingly
supportive of the hypothesis: for all combinations of policy parameters the tail probability of
the test is virtually zero (the values of the test for all λ’s and µ’s are shown in the bottom chart
of Figure 4, together with the 1 per cent critical value).
The second exercise explicitly accounts for the stochastic nature of the estimated
coefficients. In the previous section, the DEAM was assumed to describe accurately the
functioning of the economy; the stochastic nature of the estimated parameters was thus
ignored. Actually, the most one could argue is that with a certain probability the “true”
model parameters lie in the neighborhood of the estimated ones. We mean to investigate
whether our main results are robust with respect to relaxing the assumption that the data
generating process and the DEAM coincide. The need for such a check is particularly acute
22 Each replication includes 800 realizations of the shocks for the six stochastic equations in the model, one
realization per period. Only the last 400 simulated values are used to evaluate the objective function, to prevent
the results from being biased by the initial conditions. A different experiment could consist of sampling from
the error distribution, re-estimating the two models for each replication, and re-computing the rules each time.
Such an experiment, however, would by construction result in an under-performing AEAM-based rule for each
and any replication, which is not necessarily the case here.
23 The test is the standard one-sided test for the equality of the means of normally distributed variables.
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in the case at hand, because of the way in which we compare the performance of the DEAM-
based and AEAMBRs. To account for the variability of the estimated coefficients we extract
5,000 replications from the empirical distribution of the estimated DEAM coefficients and,
without re-computing the DEAM-based and AEAMBRs, we compute, for each replication of
the model coefficients, the associated loss function. We then examine the distribution of the
loss function under the two rules.
The results are shown in Figure 5. The top chart indicates that in (almost) 70 to 80
per cent of all the “alternative worlds” that are plausible (i.e., within the confidence interval)
given the estimate of the DEAM, the DEAMBR does strictly better than the AEAMBR for
any combination of the preference parameters. Hence, coefficient variability is not such as
to jeopardize our conclusions above. Furthermore, for a large percentage of replications, the
reduction of the loss function delivered by the DEAMBR is sizeable (see Monteforte and
Siviero (2003) for details). Finally, as in the exercise above, we formally test the hypothesis
that the average (across replications) welfare loss associated with the DEAMBR is lower than
the average loss obtainable with the AEAMBR (the resulting tail probabilities are shown in the
bottom chart of Figure 5). With a confidence level of 5 per cent, only for 2 combinations of
the preference parameters (less than 3 per cent of the cases) one is not able to accept the null
hypothesis (and even then is the rejection only marginal). For most combinations of preference
parameters (62 out of 77, i.e., over 80 per cent) the null hypothesis cannot be rejected at the
confidence level of 1 per cent.
Overall, these results clearly indicate that the DEAMBR tends to perform significantly
better than the AEAM-based alternative, provided that our multi-country model is a reasonable
approximation of the data generating process, or at least a more reasonable one than the
AEAM. Not only is the welfare loss associated with the AEAMBR large, but it is also
statistically significant and generally “robust” to parameter uncertainty.
But what could happen in the far future? There is no reason why convergence should
necessarily take place;24 moreover, there is no compelling evidence that much convergence
has taken place in the long run-up to the euro area,25 and the evidence presented in Section
24 Hughes Hallet and Piscitelli (2002a) show that integration may or may not imply convergence, a key factor
in determining the result being the size of the economies involved.
25 Eichengreen (1997) and Demertzis and Hughes Hallett (1998), have tackled the issue of the symmetry of
Page 17 of 66
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
17
2 shows no signs of instability in the DEAM and AEAM after the introduction of the single
currency. Moreover, the welfare distance between the two rules (both of which are computed
using models estimated with pre-euro data) remains significant even if the comparison only
focusses on the early stages of the euro era (see Monteforte and Siviero (2003) for details).
However, it may be informative to explore how the comparison between the AEAMBR
and DEAMBR would be affected were more symmetry of stochastic disturbances to prevail
among the euro area countries than detected in the past.26 We thus assume that some sort of
convergence in the stochastic processes that generate the disturbances of the DEAMwill occur
in the future. Specifically, we assume that countries that become more intimately tied to one
another will tend to share the same shocks, and that the underlying country-specific stochastic
processess will influence those common shocks proportionately to the country’s relative size
(the largest country exerting a comparatively stronger effect on the common shocks than the
other two, and so on). More in detail, we take full convergence of aggregate demand shocks
to mean that the disturbances in the aggregate demand equation become exactly the same in
all countries. As in De Grauwe and Piskorski (2001), we assume that, once full convergence
has been reached, the common variance (as well as covariances) is given by the square of a
weighted average of the historical estimated standard deviations:
σ2y|FC = (ωyGσyG + ωyFσyF + ωyIσyI )2(3)
where σ2y|FC denotes the variance of the common AD shock under convergence; σyG , σyF ,σyI
are the estimated standard deviation of AD disturbances in the three countries; ωyG,ωyF ,ωyI
are the GDP weights of the three countries.
We also consider the possibility of partial convergence, which we assume to be
parameterized by ξAD, ranging from 0 (no convergence) to 1 (full convergence). For any given
choice of the ξAD parameter, the corresponding elements of the variance-covariance matrix of
the shocks to the European economies, or lack thereof; their empirical evidence shows that, although the European
economies have followed rather similar policies in recent years, there is little evidence of a strengthening of the
degree of symmetry of the disturbances affecting the various economies.
26 In the following we focus only on the consequences of asymmetry in disturbances. As to asymmetry in
behavioral parameters, Hughes Hallett and Piscitelli (2002b) find that they are likely to destabilize the business
cycle in a way that is not wholly compensated by the existing constraints to national fiscal policies.
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the disturbances are given by:
σ2yi|PC = ξADσ
2
y|FC + (1− ξAD)σ2yi(4)
σyjyi|PC = ξADσyi|PCσyj |PC(5)
for all i, j, so that the correlation of shocks among countries is given by ξAD itself.27
Full and partial convergence of aggregate supply disturbances are defined in a similar
way, with the convergence process now parameterized by ξAS.
Turning to the results, under the extreme assumption that there are only two stochastic
processes in the euro area, the under-performance of the AEAMBR is considerably attenuated.
Figure 6 reports, for the case λ = µ = 1 (the results are similar for all other values of
the policy parameter), the additional welfare loss entailed by adopting the AEAMBR rather
than the DEAMBR, as the degree of similarity of supply- and demand-side shocks across
countries increases (in the figure, the no-convergence loss found in Section 5 is set equal to
100).28 With full convergence of shocks, there remains virtually no scope at all for using the
DEAMBR, as expected. Note, however, that a relatively high degree of (uniform) convergence
is needed before the loss associated with using the AEAMBR becomes relatively small.
Examining what happens if the pace of convergence differs on the supply- and demand-
sides (i.e., looking at the off-diagonal elements in the figure), one concludes that demand-
side convergence without supply-side convergence would not be very effective in reducing
the additional welfare loss associated with the AEAMBR. By contrast, even a limited degree
of supply-side convergence would go a long way toward making the aggregation bias issue
virtually irrelevant from a policymaking viewpoint. Whether these features are empirically
robust seem worth investigating further in future work.
27 It would, of course, be possible to introduce the further complication that the speed of convergence is
not the same for all countries. For the sake of simplicity we ignore that possibility. Let us just remark that our
concept of partial convergence tends to make cross-country heterogeneity disappear more smoothly than it would
be conceivably possible.
28 Both rules perform less satisfactorily than in the set of experiments where the historical variance-covariance
matrix was assumed to hold, the worsening being, in general, more pronounced for the DEAM-based rule (and
for the optimal instrument one) than for the AEAM-based rule. A general worsening of the optimized losses
should indeed be expected: in the latter experiment the shocks are perfectly correlated, while the historical ones
are virtually independent, and hence do not tend to reinforce each other.
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Finally, we investigated whether our results would be any different if forward-looking
AEAM- and DEAM-based rules were compared. Following Batini and Haldane (1999), we
require the policy-controlled interest rate to react to model-consistent projections of future
area-wide inflation and output gap, with the degree of forward-lookingness varying between 1
and 4. The results are not such as to modify the main message of our experiments: if inflation
and the output gap enter the policy reaction function with a 1-period lead, the additional losses
associated with using the AEAMBR draw a picture similar to Figure 1 above; the average loss
is just marginally scaled down. With leads larger than 1, the additional losses actually tend to
increase.
7. Concluding remarks: What implications for euro area econometric modelling?
The results presented in this paper suggest that heterogeneity in the economic structures
of the countries participating in the euro area is not only statistically detectable but, perhaps
more importantly, economically relevant. Specifically, monetary policy in the euro area is
likely to be more effective if the econometric tools used to support monetary policy decision-
making are disaggregate, rather than aggregate.
The welfare losses associated with an aggregate-model-based rule are not only sizeable
but also highly significant.29 Moreover, our results are generally robust with respect to model
parameter variability. Finally, while our investigation of possible instabilities of the model
in the most recent past does not suggest that euro area economies are becoming increasingly
similar to one another, we nevertheless probe what could happen if convergence occurred in
the future. We find that sizeable convergence has to occur before our conclusions no longer
apply.
Our conclusions are apparent in our simplified model for the three main countries.
Arguably they would be all the more supported if individual country models were to pay closer
attention to country-specific institutional features, labor market arrangements, tax structures,
etc., thereby presumably resulting in a more pronounced degree of asymmetry across models.
29 Moreover, according to Angelini, Del Giovane, Siviero and Terlizzese (2002), the optimized value of the
loss function could be further reduced if the single monetary policy were to exploit fully the available national
information (by not simply relying on a DEAM, but also reacting to national information). Combining these
results with ours, one can appreciate the full distance between a “pure aggregate approach” (using an AEAM to
computing the monetary policy rule) and a “full multi-country one” (using a DEAM and allowing for the policy
instrument to react to country-specific variable): the total reduction in the optimized value of the loss function is
always in the neighborhood of 50 per cent or more.
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Moreover, the odds would turn even more unfavourable to the aggregate modelling if the
possibility that the models be nonlinear was taken into account.30 In light of these remarks, it
seems legitimate to conjecture that the reduction in the welfare losses that we measure is likely
to provide a lower bound estimate.
Our results make a clear case for relying on a multi-country modelling approach when
offering advice in support of the single monetary policy, and suggest that a line of research
worth pursuing is a systematic investigation of the aggregation bias (both its size and its nature)
that is likely to affect aggregate (area-wide) estimated relationships and their effects on optimal
policies.
30 See Hughes Hallett (2000).
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Table 1
ESTIMATE OF THE AEAM
Equation for:
Input from: π y
π 0.652
(0.075)
[-1]
0.348
(restr.)
[-4]
y 0.088
(0.035)
[-1] 0.769
(0.060)
[-1]
r −.050
(0.022)
[-2]
R2 0.874 0.715
R2 0.869 0.704
σ 0.286 0.487
DW 2.209 1.800
In parentheses: standard error of the coefficients.
In brackets: lag with which the variables enter the equations.
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Table 2
ESTIMATE OF THE DEAM
Equations for: Germany Equations for: France Equations for: Italy
Input from: π y π y π y
π 0.292
(0.089)
[-1] 0.063
(restr.)
[0] 0.036
(restr.)
[0]
Germany 0.600
(0.069)
[-4]
y 0.095
(0.036)
[-1] 0.785
(0.062)
[-1] 0.173
(0.058)
[0]
r −0.073
(0.038)
[-2]
π 0.108
(restr.)
[0] 0.937
(0.044)
[-1]
y 0.022
(0.012)
[-2] 0.838
(0.052)
[-1]
France 0.022
(0.012)
[-3]
0.022
(0.012)
[-4]
0.022
(0.012)
[-5]
r −0.036
(0.015)
[-2]
π 0.964
(0.010)
[-1]
Italy y 0.064
(0.028)
[0] 0.657
(0.061)
[-1]
r −0.038
(0.016)
[-1]
R2 0.514 0.635 0.902 0.730 0.960 0.752
R2 0.483 0.622 0.894 0.720 0.958 0.740
σ 0.411 0.799 0.332 0.443 0.259 0.490
DW 2.160 2.059 2.050 1.888 2.024 1.815
In parentheses: standard error of the coefficients.
In brackets: lag with which the variables enter the equations.
Page 27 of 66
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
27
Table 3
AGGREGATION CRITERIA
DEAM AEAM
AGGREGATE SUPPLY
GG criterium 3.856 6.523
PPK criterium 0.225 0.286
AGGREGATE DEMAND
GG criterium 15.948 18.961
PPK criterium 0.449 0.487
GG : Grunfeld and Griliches (1960)
PPK: Pesaran, H.M., R. G. Pierse and M.S. Kumar (1989).
Table 4
IDIOSYNCRATIC COMPONENTS OFMODEL REGRESSORS
(percentage of the standard deviation explained
by the idiosyncratic compon nts across countries)
Country Output Gap Interest Rates
Germany 75.7 91.2
France 77.2 52.7
Italy 40.7 32.0
Note: The factor models have one common component specified as AR(2) in the case of the output gap and AR(1) for the
interest rates. The estimation algorithm is Kalman filter, solved with Berndt, Hall, Hall, and Hausman (BHHH) optimization
method; starting conditions for the AR coefficients in the common components are imposed to be equal to the OLS estimation
of AR models.
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Table 5
FORECAST ENCOMPASSING TEST REGRESSIONS
Step ahead of the prediction (quarters)
Aggregate supply π_1 π_2 π_3 π_4 π_8
cost 0.027
(0.048)
0.057
(0.070)
0.068
(0.083)
0.099
(0.093)
0.211
(0.127)
S_AEAM 0.095
(0.109)
0.169
(0.159)
0.113
(0.164)
0.200
(0.234)
0.158
(0.347)
S_DEAM 0.887
(0.119)
0.792
(0.185)
0.841
(0.203)
0.731
(0.294)
0.658
(0.431)
R2 0.92 0.88 0.85 0.81 0.63
AEAM encompass∗
F − statistic
p−value%
32.46
0
12.17
0
13.89
0
7.07
0
4.87
0.3
DEAM encompass∗∗
F − statistic
p−value%
0.51
67.7
0.67
57.0
0.45
72.0
0.71
54.9
0.92
43.3
Step ahead of the prediction (quarters)
Aggregate demand y_1 y_2 y_3 y_4 y_8
cost −0.016
(0.053)
−0.025
(0.090)
−0.022
(0.120)
−0.006
(0.141)
0.015
(0.170)
S_AEAM 0.244
(0.423)
0.088
(0.567)
0.143
(0.715)
0.369
(0.811)
0.852
(0.746)
S_DEAM 0.767
(0.418)
0.929
(0.562)
0.853
(0.754)
0.502
(0.918)
−0.310
(0.924)
R2 0.72 0.52 0.39 0.26 0.12
AEAM encompass∗
F − statistic
p−value%
1.13
34.0
0.92
43.6
0.51
67.6
0.52
66.9
0.94
42.7
DEAM encompass∗∗
F − statistic
p−value%
0.19
90.0
0.06
98.1
0.04
99.0
0.14
93.5
1.25
29.7
In parentheses: heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (Newey West) standard error of the coefficients.
∗ Test of the restrictions : coeff(AEAM)=1; coeff(DEAM)=0; constant=0.
∗∗ Test of the restrictions : coeff(AEAM)=0; coeff(DEAM)=1; constant=0.
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Table 6
FOR 2.93 2.86 0.49 1.79 1.37 4.06
DEAM-based 2.46 1.75 0.69 2.18 1.68 6.41
AEAM-based 1.66 1.27 0.75 2.42 1.62 6.84
FOR 1.18 1.23 0.67 2.18 1.29 6.41
DEAM-based 0.99 0.86 0.82 2.81 1.57 11.34
AEAM-based 0.69 0.65 0.85 3.21 1.50 12.29
FOR 2.90 3.31 0.41 1.83 1.26 5.59
DEAM-based 2.54 1.98 0.64 2.24 1.52 8.67
AEAM-based 1.64 1.42 0.70 2.63 1.42 9.50
FOR 1.19 1.34 0.64 2.20 1.25 7.86
DEAM-based 1.02 0.92 0.81 2.84 1.50 13.46
AEAM-based 0.69 0.68 0.83 3.37 1.42 14.91
FOR 2.88 3.68 0.35 1.89 1.20 7.10
DEAM-based 2.61 2.19 0.61 2.32 1.43 10.84
AEAM-based 1.65 1.57 0.66 2.85 1.32 12.18
FOR 1.20 1.44 0.62 2.22 1.22 9.38
DEAM-based 1.06 0.98 0.79 2.88 1.45 15.64
AEAM-based 0.70 0.72 0.82 3.54 1.35 17.70
Standard deviation of:
Annualized 
Inflation Output gap
Parameter values in 
the loss function: Type of rule
Reaction function coefficients and loss values for the optimal, the AEAM-based and the DEAM-based rules
λ = 0.1
Annualized 
Inflation Output gap
Lagged 
interest rate
Loss
Coefficients on:
λ = 1
λ = 2
µ=0.1
µ=1
µ=0.1
µ=1
µ=0.1
µ=1
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Figure 1
 
Percentage additional loss, AEAM-based rule vs. DEAM-based rule
(as a share of the additional loss with the DEAM-based rule vs. the loss with the FO rule)
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Figure 2
(c) m=2.0 (d) m=3.0
(a) m=0.5 (b) m=1.0
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Note: The curves in the chart show, for each rule, the ratio between the loss that obtains with the corresponding parameter value on the x-axis and the 
loss delivered by the first-best optimal policy.
Coefficient of euro-area output gap
Coefficient of lagged interest rate
Figure 3
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Figure 4
(reverse scale)
Percentage of cases in which the DEAM-based rule outperforms the AEAM-based rule
Random drawings from distribution of estimation residuals, 
DEAM-based rule vs. AEAM-based rule
Random drawings from distribution of estimated DEAM residuals
Testing the significance of the underperformance of the AEAM-based rule
Test that the average loss associated with the DEAM-based rule 
is lower than the one associated with the AEAM-based rule
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Figure 5
(tail probability)
Random drawings from distribution of estimated DEAM parameters,
DEAM-based rule vs. AEAM-based rule
Percentage of cases in which the DEAM-based rule outperforms the AEAM-based rule
Random drawings from distribution of estimated DEAM parameters
Testing the significance of the underperformance of the AEAM-based rule
Test that the average loss associated with the DEAM-based rule 
is lower than the one associated with the AEAM-based rule
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Figure 6
Additional welfare loss, AEAM-based rule vs. DEAM-based rule
(with gradual convergence of Phillips curve and aggregate demand stochastic processes, λ = µ = 1;
the additional loss in the case of no convergence is set=100)
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The economic consequences
of euro area modelling shortcuts
Libero Monteforte, Stefano Siviero∗
Abstract
Should euro-area economies be modelled in an aggregate (area-wide) fash-
ion or in a disaggregate (multi-country) one? This paper tackles that ques-
tion from both a statistical and an economic viewpoint. From a statistical
viewpoint, aggregation bias criteria are found to signal that the degree of
structural heterogeneity among euro-area economies is such that the loss
of information entailed by an aggregate modelling approach may be far
from trifling. From an economic viewpoint, we investigate the following
issue: Are those statistically detectable heterogeneities of any practical
relevance when it comes to supporting monetary policy decision-making?
To provide an answer to this question, we compute simple optimal mone-
tary policy reaction functions on the basis of either an aggregate model or
a disaggregate one, and compare the associated welfare losses. The results
suggest that the welfare under-performance of an area-wide-model-based
rule is not only non negligible, but also robust with respect to a number
of sensitivity analyses.
1 Introduction
The introduction of the single currency in a number of European countries
on January 1st, 1999, raised a number of novel challenges for European policy-
makers, economic scholars and practitioners alike. Concerning specifically macro-
economic modelling challenges, monetary policymaking for the euro area as a
whole requires that policy analyses and projections, previously run on a country-
by-country basis, be extended to cover all economies in the area in a consistent
way. This poses the following basic issue: Should the Eurozone economy be
modelled as if it was one single, large economy (area-wide, or aggregate, ap-
proach)? Or, alternatively, should disaggregate country data be used to build
inter-linked single-country models (multi-country, or disaggregate, approach)?
In principle, aggregate models are sub-optimal whenever the individual units
being aggregated display some degree of heterogeneity. Most empirical studies
of the euro-area economy indicate that the extent of the divergences in the
∗Banca d’Italia, Department for Economic Outlook and Monetary Policy Studies;
libero.monteforte@bancaditalia.it; stefano.siviero@bancaditalia.it. We thank the late Albert
Ando, Paolo Angelini, Fabio Busetti, Jürgen von Hagen, Andrew Hughes Hallett, Marco Lippi,
Daniele Terlizzese, John Williams; two anonymous referees; participants in the CEPR-ZEI
Conference “Empirical Models of the Euro Economy 2: Sectoral Aspects and Performance,”
Bonn, 2003; participants in the Ecomod 2003 Conference, Istanbul, 2003; and participants in
workshops at the Center for Financial Studies (CFS), the Banque de France and University
of Rome “La Sapienza” for many helpful comments and suggestions on previous versions of
this work. The usual disclaimers apply. The views expressed in this paper are those of the
authors and do necessarily represent those of the Bank of Italy.
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behaviour of the participating economies –particularly as far as the monetary
transmission mechanisms is concerned– is far from being negligible: relevant
peculiarities still exist, and they are likely to reflect deep structural diﬀerences.1
Despite the wealth of evidence on the heterogeneity of euro-area economies,
few systematic eﬀorts have been made so far to assess the statistical significance
of that heterogeneity and to test whether the modelling of aggregate euro-area
data –as opposed to individual country ones– is a sound econometric strat-
egy. Furthermore, to our knowledge no attempt has been made to explore the
economic implications of that issue.
This paper tackles the aggregate/disaggregate euro-area modelling trade-oﬀ
from both a statistical and, most relevantly, an economic viewpoint.
From a statistical viewpoint, the greater parsimony and trasparency of ag-
gregate models usually comes at the cost of an aggregation bias. We briefly
report on the results of checking –using a number of criteria and diagnostics
proposed in the literature– whether signs of aggregation bias may be detected
in the estimates of a stylised model of the euro area, and assess the size of
that bias. We find that the empirical evidence consistently supports the conclu-
sion that ignoring the heterogeneity of euro-area countries entails statistically
significant misuse of information.
The core of the paper is the analysis of the aggregate/disaggregate trade-oﬀ
from an economic viewpoint: We propose a model-selection-criterion that relies
on economic arguments rather than statistical ones. We begin by remarking
that statistical evidence of aggregation bias cannot per se be taken to imply that
the use of aggregate econometric tools would result in dramatically unreliable
analyses and insight, and hence in markedly sub-optimal economic decisions.
To explore whether or not that would be the case, we assess the performance
of two hypothetical euro-area monetary policy-makers: The first relies on an
aggregate model of the euro area, while the second takes her decisions on the
basis of a disaggregate model. We then explore whether the performance of the
former policy-maker would be perceivably worse than that of the latter. Our
approach may thus be viewed as proposing a policy-based metric for appraising
the economic relevance of structural heterogeneities across euro-area economies.2
Should this analysis suggest that no big welfare losses are at stake, an area-
wide modelling approach might remain the preferred option, regardless of what
the standard statistical checks of aggregation bias may indicate. Our findings
suggest that the additional welfare losses that would be incurred by relying on
an aggregate modelling approach –as opposed to a disaggregate one– may be
far from trifling. This conclusion, while necessarily model-dependent, appears
to be robust with respect to a number of sensitivity analyses.
1A (very) partial list of works that have a bearing on this issue includes Ramaswamy and
Sloek (1997), Dornbusch, Favero and Giavazzi (1998), Guiso, Kashyap, Panetta and Terl-
izzese (1999), Clements, Kontolemis and Levy (2001), Ciccarelli and Rebucci (2002), Perman
and Tavera (2005), Dedola and Lippi (2005), and the papers collected in Angeloni, Kashyap
and Mojon (2003). Not much eﬀort has yet been devoted to trying to identify, with the
aid of macroeconometric models, the structural determinants underlying the observed het-
erogeneities. Fragmentary evidence may be found in van Els, Locarno, Mojon and Morgan
(2003).
2From the viewpoint of the debate on robust rules (see the contributions in Taylor (1999),
as well as Levin and Williams (2003) and Adalid, Coenen, McAdam and Siviero (2005)), this
paper may be viewed as focussing on one particular type of robustness (i.e., robustness with
respect to the assumption of aggregability).
2
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A few papers have addressed the aggregate/disaggregate trade-oﬀ in the
context of euro-area monetary policymaking from diﬀerent angles: De Grauwe
and Piskorski (2001) and Aksoy, De Grauwe and Dewachter (2002) investigate
the implications of nationalistic attitude of the ECB Governing Council mem-
bers, and assess how the performance of euro-area monetary policy is aﬀected
by diﬀerent definitions of preferences (specifically, they contrast loss functions
defined over area-wide aggregates and loss functions that are weighted averages
of the individual national central banks’ ones). Angelini, Del Giovane, Siviero
and Terlizzese (2007) focus on the role that should, or should not, be played
by information at the national level in setting the single monetary policy of
the euro area, under the maintained assumption that preferences are defined
over area-wide aggregates. They find that, by reacting to national information,
the euro-area central bank attains significant reductions in (aggregate) inflation
and output variability, as opposed to the case in which the interest rate reacts
to area-wide variables only. This paper may thus be viewed as filling a gap in
the literature, by focussing on the implications of the aggregate/disaggregate
trade-oﬀ on modelling-for-policy choices. Contrary to De Grauwe and Piskorski
(2001) and Aksoy, De Grauwe and Dewachter (2002), we maintain the assump-
tion that the policy-maker’s preferences be area-wide; contrary to Angelini, Del
Giovane, Siviero and Terlizzese (2007) we do not assume modelling choices to
be given. Rather, we are interested in testing whether adopting an aggregate
or a disaggregate modelling strategy may significantly alter the performance of
the euro-area monetary policy-maker.
In short, our findings are as follows: Disaggregate euro-area modelling ap-
pears to be sharply preferable from a welfare viewpoint; aggregate modelling
results in the monetary policy-maker being arguably too timid when it comes
to reining in average inflation across a number of heterogeneous economies.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 shortly describes the two basic
modelling options faced by euro-area modellers and presents and compares the
main features of the stylised aggregate and disaggregate models used in the
remainder of the paper. Section 3 briefly presents the results of a number of
aggregation bias tests and criteria. Section 4 presents our approach to appraising
the economic relevance of structural heterogeneity across euro-area countries.
Section 5 oﬀers a quantification of the additional welfare losses that would be
incurred if euro-area monetary policy was to rely on an aggregate model rather
than a disaggregate one, and investigates the model (and rule) features from
which those additional losses originate. Section 6 provides an estimate of the
significance of the additional losses. Section 7 explores the robustness of the
main results, addessing issues such as: How would the results change should
euro-area economies tend to converge in the future? Would the conclusions be
diﬀerent if the competing rules were assumed to be forward-looking? Section 8
concludes.
2 Two simple models of the euro area
When it comes to building empirical tools for euro-area forecasting and policy
analysis purposes, two basic options are available: as a first alternative, one
could build a disaggregate, or multi-country, model, i.e., a model describing the
functioning of the economic mechanisms in the individual countries of the area
3
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and the inter-linkages amongst them; in such a model, country-specific features
may be reflected by either the structure of the country sub-models and/or the
value of their parameters. As a second, much less onerous, alternative, one
may first aggregate the individual country data3 and model the latter as if they
referred to one single, large and homogeneous economy (aggregate, or area-wide,
model).4
In this paragraph we describe the two (aggregate and disaggregate) simple
AS-AD models used in the remainder of the paper and present their main prop-
erties. Several variants of models of the same kind as the ones we consider have
been widely used in the literature on optimal policy rules.5 The models we
use here have also been employed in two papers assessing the role of diﬀerent
information and diﬀerent models in the conduct of euro-area monetary policy.
In Angelini, Del Giovane, Siviero and Terlizzese (2007) the use of a monetary
policy reaction function specified on country-specific variables is compared with
a rule specified on area-wide variables, using the same disaggregate model as
in this paper. In Adalid, Coenen, McAdam and Siviero (2005) the same model
takes part in a four-model quest for a robust euro-area monetary policy rule.
Finally, Monteforte (2007) runs extensive econometric testing of aggregation
bias using the same models as in this paper.
Both models presented below are purely backward-looking and are thus po-
tentially aﬀected by the issue of policy-dependent parameters (Lucas Critique).6
However, the empirical evidence presented below overwhelmingly supports the
hypothesis of structural stability, even for the most recent period, when, ar-
guably, a major shock (the launching of the single monetary policy itself, no
less) occurred in the policy regime. Also, models belonging to the same broad
family as the ones used here are largely (though not exclusively) relied upon by
the euro-area monetary policy-maker.
The Aggregate Euro Area Model (AEAM) is a simple two-equation model
estimated using aggregate data for the three largest economies in the euro area
(Germany, France and Italy, jointly accounting for over 70 per cent of the area
GDP). It includes an aggregate supply equation (also referred to as Phillips
curve) and an aggregate demand equation (also referred to as IS curve). The first
equation determines inflation as a function of lagged inflation and the output
gap; the sum of the coeﬃcients on lagged inflation is constrained to unit so that
the Phillips curve is of the accelerationist type.7 The second equation relates
the output gap to its own lagged values and the real interest rate.8
3Labhard, Weeken and Westaway (2001) argue that the actual choice of the aggregating
function is unlikely to aﬀect the properties of the model in any significant way. The aggregating
functions used in this paper are briefly described below.
4Both approaches are being pursued in practice, even by the same institutions. For in-
stance, the European Central Bank (ECB) maintains an aggregate econometric model (see
Fagan, Henry and Mestre (2001)), called AWM (Area Wide Model), and a disaggregate one,
called MCM (Multi Country Model). Also, the euro-area projections by the Eurosystem (the
institution comprising the ECB and the national central banks of euro-area countries) are the
result of a multi-staged process that involves both country-specific and area-wide models (see
ECB (2001)).
5 See Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) for a strictly backward-looking version and Clarida,
Gali and Gertler (1999) for a fully forward-looking one.
6Lucas (1976). See, however, Sims (1982), Farmer (1991), Favero and Hendry (1992)
and Altissimo, Siviero and Terlizzese (2002) for a number of arguments that mitigate the
implications of the Lucas Critique.
7A Wald test cannot reject the restriction (p-value of 18.8 per cent).
8Neither equation includes foreign variables; in other words, the euro area is modelled as a
4
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A general-to-specific modelling approach was followed in searching for a sat-
isfactory empirical specification, starting with 6 lags for all variables on the
right-hand-side of the two equations. The final specification is the following:
πt+1 = α1πt + (1− α1)πt−3 + η0yt+1 + ut+1 (1)
yt+1 = θ1yt + ψ2(it−1 − 4 · πt−1) + vt+1
where πt+1 is the quarter-on-quarter consumer inflation rate; yt+1 is the output
gap; it+1 is the short-term interest rate; it+1−k− 4 ·πt+1−k = rt+1 is a measure
of the ex-post real interest rate.9
The model was estimated with GMM, using White’s diagonal weighting ma-
trix, thus allowing for the possibility of correlation between the residuals of the
two equations. As to the interest rate, we assume it to aﬀect the output gap
only with a lag, consistently with most empirical evidence; estimation could
hence be carried out without augmenting the estimated model with an interest
rate reaction function. The sample period extends from 1978.Q1 to 2004.Q4,
totalling 108 quarterly observations. The estimation results are presented in
Table 1.
The Disaggregate Euro Ar a Model (DEAM) includes, for each of the three
largest euro-area countries, the same set of equations as the AEAM. The speci-
fication of both the aggregate supply and aggregate demand equations is similar
to the one adopted in the AEAM but, in addition, it allows for cross-country
linkages. Specifically, in the AS equation inflation in any given country depends
not only on its own lagged values and the output gap, but also, at least in
principle, on inflation “imported” from the other two countries (inflation im-
ported from either country is given, in estimation, by the sum of inflation in
that country and the rate of change of the relevant bilateral exchange rate; the
latter term is obviously dropped in the simulations below, consistently with the
adoption of the single currency as of January 1st, 1999). Analogously to the
case of the AEAM, the sum of the coeﬃcients on lagged and imported inflation
is constrained to be 1.10 Similarly, in the AD equation the output gap in any of
the three countries depends on its own lagged values and on the corresponding
real interest rate, as in the AEAM; in addition, it may react to the output gap
in the other two countries, reflecting trade linkages.
As the model set-up allows for instantaneous cross-country linkages, it was
estimated with 3SLS. The sample period extends from 1978.Q1 to 2004.Q4, as
for the AEAM.11
closed economy, similarly to what is systematically done for the US, and increasingly for the
euro area as well.
9The source of data is the ESA-95 National Accounts for inflation and the output gap, and
the BIS data-bank for the short-term interest rate. Inflation is measured by the quarter-on-
quarter rate of change of the (seasonally adjusted) households’ consumption deflator. Potential
output was estimated by applying a band-pass filter (Baxter and King (1995)) to the (log)
GDP, selecting frequency components of 32 quarters and higher, with a truncation of 16
quarters. National variables were aggregated using a fixed-weight procedure. For inflation,
1999 PPP consumer spending shares were used. For the output gap, the weights are given by
1999 PPP real GDP shares. For interest rates, the weights are the PPP nominal GDP shares
computed by the OECD. The GDP and consumer spending weights are, respectively 0.43 and
0.44 for Germany, 0.29 and 0.27 for France, 0.28 and 0.29 for Italy.
10A Wald test on the restriction cannot reject with P values of 16,8%, 5,2% and 83,3% for
Germany, France and Italy, respectively.
11For most of the sample period, the exchange rates among Germany, France and Italy,
5
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The general form of the two-equation sub-model for country j is the follow-
ing:12
πjt+1 =
pX
k=1
αj,kπ
j
t+1−k +
X
i6=j
pX
k=0
βj,i,k(π
i
t+1−k +
.
ei,jt+1−k) +
pX
k=0
ηj,ky
j
t+1−k + u
j
t+1(2)
yjt+1 =
pX
k=1
θj,ky
j
t+1−k +
X
i6=j
pX
k=0
ϕj,i,ky
i
t+1−k +
pX
k=1
ψj,k(i
j
t+1−k − 4 · πjt+1−k) + vjt+1
where: j = G,F, I denotes the diﬀerent countries and
.
ei,jt+1−k is the quarter-on-
quarter rate of change of the exchange rate between country i and country j
(units of country j’s currency for 1 unit of country i’s currency).
The starting specification included on the right-hand-side of each estimated
equation the first 6 lags of all relevant variables. Joint estimation of the three
sub-models resulted, after dropping all insignificant lags, in a much more parsi-
monious specification (see Table 2).
The AEAM and DEAM were estimated with data straddling the introduc-
tion of the euro. It may thus be feared that, notwithstanding their performance
in the estimation period, those models might be aﬀected by structural discon-
tinuities following the birth of the euro area. To explore whether this is the
case, we performed stability analysis for both models; the test is particularly
challenging, as we checked whether the model estimates based solely on pre-
euro data (1978.Q1 to 1998.Q4) remain statistically stable over a sample period
consisting exclusively of post-euro observations (1999.Q1 to 2004.Q4).
The results of direct stability testing are shown in Tables 3 and 4 and Fig-
ures 1 and 2. For both models, the empirical evidence systematically rejects the
hypothesis of parameter instability. Furthermore, Figure 2 shows no detectable
signs of convergence of the DEAM parameters (actually, the cross-country dis-
persion of the parameters tends to be larger at the end of the sample than it
was before the introduction of the euro).
The impulse responses of the models –computed after augmenting both
models with the same Taylor-type stabilizing policy rule– are broadly in line
with well-established stylized facts about the euro-area economy. In particular:
(i) any shock tends to result in remarkably persistent deviations from the equi-
librium; (ii) a monetary policy shock initially aﬀects output more than inflation;
(iii) the full response of output and inflation to an interest rate shock takes some
time to materialize.13 The general pattern of most impulse responses is similar
in the two models. However, deviations from the equilibrium tend to be more
pronounced and persistent in the DEAM; also, because of the generally more
though constrained by the ERM of the EMS, were not fixed; lagged values of all variables
included in the model were used as instruments for the exchange rates. As in the AEAM, the
interest rate enters the AD equations with a lag.
12 In keeping with the approach followed in similar literature, neither the AEAM nor the
DEAM that we use for our experiments below include any constant terms, i.e., they may be
taken to provide a description of the functioning of the euro area economy in the neighborhood
of equilibrium. This amounts to implicitly assuming that the same equilibrium values apply
to all countries, a condition that does not necessarily hold in the sample period, particularly
regarding the (implied) equilibrium real interest rates.
13For more details, see the mimeo version of this paper (Monteforte and Siviero (2003)). As
a term of comparison, see the evidence presented in the papers collected in Angeloni, Kashyap
and Mojon (2003).
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pronounced impact of aggregate supply and aggregate demand shocks in the
DEAM, monetary policy tends to be more activist than in the AEAM, even if
both models are augmented with exactly the same Taylor-type rule.
Finally, while the representation of the functioning of the (three largest
economies in the) euro area provided by either the AEAM or the DEAM is
admittedly rather crude, a comparison of the diﬀerences between (larger-size)
aggregate and disaggregate econometric models basically leads to the same con-
clusions as above.14
3 Direct aggregation bias investigation
Analysis of aggregation bias dates back to Theil’s (1954) seminal work. In that
set-up, the aggregation bias vanishes, under the assumption that both the ag-
gregate and disaggregate equations are correctly specified, in only two cases:
(i) micro homogeneity (i.e., when the parameters of any disaggregate equation
are identical to those of any other); (ii) compositional stability (i.e., when the
ratio between each disaggregate exogenous variable and the corresponding ag-
gregate one is constant over time). If none of those two conditions hold, the
aggregate relationship has an additional error component as compared with the
disaggregate ones; such additional components is what Theil (1954) labelled
“aggregation bias”.
The most natural criterion to assess the relevance of the aggregation bias
consists of comparing the sum of squared residuals associated with the disaggre-
gate equations with that of the aggregate one, as first proposed by Grunfeld and
Griliches (1960). Pesaran, Pierse and Kumar (1989) proposed a slightly diﬀerent
criterion, which corrects for small sample bias in the sum of square residuals. If
the micro equations are correctly specified, the latter is necessarily smaller than
or at most equal to the former by construction. However, the opposite may well
happen in practice if the equations that are compared are aﬀected by misspec-
ification errors. Monteforte (2007) developed a factor-analysis-based approach
for aggregation bias testing. In short, that approach rests on identifying the
idiosyncratic components of the micro equations: intuitively, the larger those
components, the less appropriate the assumption of aggregability. Zellner and
Tobias (2000) and Baltagi, Griﬃn and Xiong (2000) advocated assessing the rel-
evance of the aggregation bias on the basis of the relative forecast performance
of the aggregate and disaggregate models.
In the case at hand, all those criteria and tests consistently point in the
direction of rejecting the hypothesis of no aggregation bias.
Grunfeld and Griliches’s (1960) and Pesaran, Pierse and Kumar’s (1989)
criteria for the AEAM and DEAM are shown in Table 5. Clear signs of aggre-
gation bias emerge on the basis of both criteria, particularly in the case of the
aggregate supply (Phillips Curve) equations. The DEAM model outperforms
the AEAM also in term of forecasting ability, as shown by the RMSE errors
at various step in Table 6. Analogous indications are provided by the criteria
based on factor models.15
Our results are consistent with those of Mayes and Virén (2000), who find
that asymmetries across euro-area aggregate supply curves are very pronounced;
14A thorough comparison may be found in Monteforte and Siviero (2003).
15More detailed results may be found in Monteforte (2007).
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Fabiani and Morgan (2003) also find evidence of asymmetry of Phillips curves.
These results are consistent with those of Perman and Tavera (2005), find-
ing increasing dispersion in the unemployment-output relation across euro area
countries.
To sum up, all available evidence indicates that the hypothesis of no aggre-
gation bias cannot be accepted, especially in the case of the aggregate supply
equations.
4 Indirect aggregation bias investigation: De-
sign of experiment
In the light of the results of the previous section, a disaggregate modelling ap-
proach of the euro area appears to be statistically sounder than its alternative.
It remains to be ascertained whether it is also preferable from an economic
viewpoint. To do this, we compare the performance of two hypothetical Euro-
pean monetary policy-makers. The first policy-maker is posited to assume that
the functioning of the euro area economy is well represented by the AEAM; by
contrast, the second policy-maker’s reaction is computed on the basis of the
DEAM.
Since the vector of state variables is diﬀerent for the two models, the cor-
responding optimal instrument rules (i.e., rules that exploit all the information
provided by the whole set of state variables; since such rules attain the best pos-
sible outcome, we call them “fully optimal” and label them “FO”) would not be
easily comparable. We thus impose that both rules belong to the Taylor-type
family (i.e., the arguments of both rules are the current area-wide inflation and
output gap and the lagged value of the policy instrument only).16 For the sake
of making the comparison as fair as possible, we further require the DEAM-
based rule (henceforth, DEAMBR) to respond to area-wide aggregates only, as
is necessarily the case for the AEAM-based rule (AEAMBR).
A standard time-separable quadratic loss function is assumed, its arguments
being the euro area average inflation rate and output gap, and a term that
attaches a cost to the volatility of the policy instrument; i.e.:
Lt = Et
∞X
τ=0
δτ [(4πt+τ )2 + λ · y2t+τ + μ · (∆it+τ )2] (3)
where δ is a discount factor, and λ and μ are parameters that reflect the policy-
maker’s preferences; 4πt is the annualised quarter-on-quarter consumer inflation
rate. Note that eq. (3) implies that the euro-area policy-maker is only interested
in euro-area average outcomes, in line with the oﬃcial Eurosystem’s view of the
monetary policy objective and strategy.
For δ → 1 the sum in eq. (3) may be interpreted as the unconditional mean
of the period loss function (see, e.g., Rudebusch and Svensson (1999)), which is
given by the weighted sum of the unconditional variances of the target variables:
Lt = var[4πt] + λ · var[yt] + μ · var[∆it] (4)
16The simple optimal monetary policy rules we consider have been used in earlier works
modelling the monetary policy of the ECB (see, e.g., Garcia-Iglesias (2007)).
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In the following we adopt the loss function defined as in eq. (4). The
search for simple optimal policies was repeated for a range of values for both
λ and μ, spanning from the case in which the monetary policy-maker is only
interested in inflation (λ = μ = 0) to the opposite extreme, in which the policy-
maker attaches a comparatively high cost to deviations of the output gap from
its equilibrium value and to the volatility of the policy-controlled interest rate
(λ = 2, μ = 1).
The two competing rules may thus be synthetically described as follows:
AEAMBR
min
γA1 ,γ
A
2 ,γ
A
3
Et
P∞
τ=0 Lt+τ = min
γA1 ,γ
A
2 ,γ
A
3
Et
P∞
τ=0[(4πt+τ )
2 + λ · y2t+τ + μ · (∆it+τ )2]
s.to: • AEAM (see Section 2)
• it = γA1 · (4πt) + γA2 · yt + γA3 · it−1
and:
DEAMBR
min
γM1 ,γ
M
2 ,γ
M
3
Et
P∞
τ=0 Lt+τ = min
γM1 ,γ
M
2 ,γ
M
3
Et
P∞
τ=0[(4πt+τ )
2 + λ · y2t+τ + μ · (∆it+τ )2]
s.to: • DEAM (see Section 2)
• it = γM1 · (4πt) + γM2 · yt + γM3 · it−1
Let us now tackle the crucial issue of how the performance of these two rules
is to be compared. The statistical evidence presented in Section 3 clearly in-
dicates that the DEAM provides a more reliable description of the functioning
of the euro-area economy than the AEAM. Accordingly, we assess, using the
DEAM and the corresponding variance-covariance matrix of residuals, the wel-
fare function values associated with the optimised AEAMBR and DEAMBR,
computed as described above.
Given the way in which the two rules are compared, it is obviously the case
that the AEAMBR cannot outperform the DEAMBR by construction. However,
the under-performance of the AEAMBR might well be trifling. Our results
below suggest that the welfare distance between the two rules is significantly
and robustly non-negligible.
As a benchmark, we also compute, on the basis of the DEAM, the FO rule
and the associated optimised target variances and welfare loss.17 This third set
of results is used to compare the gains attainable with the DEAMBR with the
(larger) ones that could be achieved by relying on the rule that, by definition,
performs best within the DEAM.
17For this purpose, we solve a standard stochastic linear regulator problem (see Chow
(1970), Sargent (1987), and, for an application to the issue of optimal monetary policy design,
Rudebusch and Svensson (1999)).
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5 Main results
The main results of our experiments are shown in Figures 3 and 4 and Table 7.18
Let us focus first on the outcomes of the two competing rules (Figure 3). The
top chart of the figure reports the percentage increase in the optimised value
of the objective function if the AEAMBR is followed instead of the DEAMBR.
The welfare losses are far from negligible, being smallest (between 10 and 20
per cent) in the neighborhood of λ = μ = 0, excluding, however, the latter case:
in case the policy-maker only cares about inflation, the welfare loss entailed
by the AEAMBR is over 32 per cent. The loss exceeds 20 per cent for most
of the preference parameter combinations, particularly if the weights of either
the output gap or the volatility of the policy instrument are relatively high.
The key message is that ignoring the structural diﬀerences among the euro
area economies, and so adopting a model that treats them as a single and
homogeneous “whole,” tends to lead to a sizeable worsening of the performance
of monetary policy, particularly if the policy-maker only cares about inflation.19
The bottom chart of Figure 3 reports the same results in relative terms, using
the FO rule as a benchmark; the chart suggests that an hypothetical policy-
maker relying on the AEAM would go a long way towards further worsening
the distance (measured in terms of welfare) between the DEAMBR and the FO
rule. In particular, the AEAMBR implies an additional loss ranging from about
40 per cent to over 110 per cent of the loss that is incurred if the DEAMBR,
rather than the FO rule, is followed. Thus, adopting the best possible rule
as a benchmark, the gains attainable by using the DEAMBR rather than the
AEAMBR are considerable.
The results can be assessed directly in terms of the optimised unconditional
standard deviations of inflation, the output gap and interest rate changes. This
is done in Figure 4, which shows the optimal inflation/output gap frontiers (in
terms of optimized standard deviations of those variables) for the AEAMBR,
DEAMBR and FO rule. For each competing rule the frontier has been com-
puted, for given μ, by letting λ take a grid of values between 0 (north-west) and
2 (south-east).
Can one trace these outcomes back to the properties of the diﬀerent optimal
rules, and in particular to the optimised parameters on inflation, the output
gap and the lagged interest rate in the monetary policy reaction functions? A
selection of the latter are presented in Table 7. Compared with the DEAMBR,
the AEAMBR is systematically “not reactive enough” to either inflation or the
output gap; for instance, for λ = μ = 1, the optimal response to inflation is 0.94
according to the DEAMBR, but only 0.67 in the AEAMBR. Similarly for the
output gap, and for all combinations of loss function weights. The AEAMBR
would thus result in the policy-maker’s reaction to the state of the economy
being arguably too timid.
Further insight on the nature of the two rules is provided by “Fault toler-
ance analysis,” as proposed by Levin and Williams (2003). Figure 5 shows the
18Most of the computations relied on Matlab routines (in turn calling AIM to compute the
state-space representation of the models; AIM is available on the website of the Board of the
Federal Reserve System). The simulations with random drawings from the distribution of
estimated residuals were run in Speakeasy/Modeleasy+. All software codes are available from
the authors upon request.
19The countries that would benefit the most from adopting the DEAMBR rather than the
AEAMBR are Germany and France.
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increase in the welfare loss that arises as the parameters of the policy rules move
away from the optimal ones. The results suggest that the degrees of fault toler-
ance of the two rules are not markedly dissimilar, although the DEAMBR tends
to be somewhat more tolerant for the inflation and output gap coeﬃcients. The
results are heavily aﬀected by the loss function weights: specifically, the degree
of fault tolerance declines sharply, for all rules and for all parameters, as the
weights of the output gap and the interest rate volatility increase.
6 Testing the significance of the results
This Section investigates whether the results above are significant. To do so, we
perform two stochastic simulation exercises.
The first exercise consists of extracting 1,000 replications from the set of
estimated residuals and simulating the DEAM, for each replication, under ei-
ther one or the other of the two competing rules.20 The results show that the
DEAMBR delivers a better outcome than the alternative in the overwhelming
majority of replications (always at least 80 per cent, and virtually 100 per cent
for λ = μ = 0); see the top chart of Figure 6). Hence, not only is the gain
large on average, but is also systematic. We also formally tested the hypothesis
that the average welfare loss associated with following the DEAMBR is lower
than the average loss with the AEAMBR.21 The results are overwhelmingly
supportive of the hypothesis: for all combinations of policy parameters the tail
probability of the test is virtually zero (the values of the test for all λ’s and μ’s
are shown in the bottom chart of Figure 6).
The second exercise explicitly accounts for the stochastic nature of the esti-
mated model coeﬃcients. In the previous section, the DEAM was assumed to
accurately describe the functioning of the economy; the stochastic nature of the
estimated parameters was thus ignored. We mean to investigate whether our
main results are robust with respect to relaxing that assumption. To account for
the variability of the estimated coeﬃcients we extract 2,000 replications from
the empirical distribution of the estimated DEAM coeﬃcients and, without
re-computing the DEAMBR and AEAMBR, we calculate, for each replication
of the model coeﬃcients, the associated loss function. We then examine the
distribution of the loss function under the two rules.
The results are shown in Figure 7. The top chart indicates that in over
75 per cent of all “alternative worlds” that are plausible given the estimate
of the DEAM, the DEAMBR does strictly better than the AEAMBR for any
combination of the preference parameters. Hence, coeﬃcient variability is not
such as to jeopardize our conclusions above. Furthermore, for a large percentage
of replications, the reduction of the loss function delivered by the DEAMBR is
sizeable.22 Finally, as in the exercise above, we formally test the hypothesis that
the average (across replications) welfare loss associated with the DEAMBR is
lower than the average loss obtainable with the AEAMBR. The resulting tail
20Each replication includes 800 realizations of the shocks for the six stochastic equations in
the model, one realization per period. Only the last 400 simulated values are used to evaluate
the objective function, to prevent the results from being biased by the initial conditions.
21The test is the standard one-sided test for the equality of the means of normally distributed
variables. The 1% critical value is 2.326.
22 See Monteforte and Siviero (2003) for details.
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probabilities are shown in the bottom chart of Figure 7: They exceed 70 per
cent for all combinations of preference parameters.
We conclude that not only is the welfare loss associated with the AEAMBR
large, but it is also statistically significant and robust to parameter uncertainty.
7 Pre-euro data and post-euro modelling, and
other robustness checks
The single currency has been in place only for part (though not a negligible
part) of the AEAM and DEAM estimation sample. One may thus legitimately
question the future validity of results partly relying on pre-euro observations
(an issue which of course applies to all euro-area empirical investigations). The
short answer to such concern is that our results appear to be valid and reliable
for three reasons.
Firstly, the available empirical evidence shows that there is no compelling
evidence that heterogeneity of euro area countries has declined in the recent
past. Eichengreen (1997) and Demertzis, Hughes Hallett and Rummell (1998),
have tackled the issue of the symmetry of the shocks to the European economies,
or lack thereof; although the European economies have followed rather similar
policies for quite some time, there is little evidence of a strengthening of the
degree of symmetry of the disturbances aﬀecting the various economies. More
recently, Busetti, Forni, Harvey and Venditti (2006) have shown that the con-
vergence of inflation dynamics in euro countries actually came to a stop and
inverted after 1998. Moreover, there is no evidence of a structural break in
the monetary policy transmission mechanisms after the introduction of the euro
(Clausen and Hayo (2006)).
Secondly, the empirical evidence in Section 2 shows no sign of instability in
the estimated parameters of the two models after the introduction of the single
currency.
Thirdly, the welfare distance between the AEAMBR and DEAMBR remains
virtually the same if we truncate the sample before the introduction of the
euro.23 Increasing the share of post-euro data from zero (with the sample trun-
cated at 1998.Q4) to about one-fourth of the sample (with the sample extending
to 2004.Q4) actually strngthens the conclusions.
But what could happen in the far future? There is no reason why con-
vergence should necessarily be assumed to take place.24 Indeed, as mentioned
earlier, there is no evidence that much convergence has taken place in the long
stretch of time since the start of the run-up to EMU. However, it may be infor-
mative to explore how the comparison between the AEAMBR and DEAMBR
would be aﬀected in case the heterogeneity of euro area countries’ stochastic
disturbances gradually vanishes. We thus assume convergence to occur in the
stochastic processes that generate the disturbances of the DEAM. Specifically,
we assume that, once full convergence is reached, the three countries share the
same shocks, which reflect, proportionately to the country’s relative size, the
(original) country-specific stochastic processes; as in De Grauwe and Piskorski
23See the results in the mimeo version of this paper, Monteforte and Siviero (2003), where
the sample ends in 1998.Q4.
24Hughes Hallet and Piscitelli (2002) show that integration may or may not imply conver-
gence, a key factor in determining the result being the size of the economies involved.
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(2001), the common variance is given by the square of a weighted average of the
historical estimated standard deviations:
σ2y|FC = (ωyGσyG + ωyF σyF + ωyIσyI )
2 (5)
where σ2y|FC denotes the variance of the common AD shock under convergence;
σyG , σyF , σyI are the estimated standard deviation of AD disturbances in the
three countries; ωyG , ωyF , ωyI are the GDP weights of the three countries.
We also consider the possibility of partial convergence, which we assume to
be parameterized by ξAD, ranging from 0 (no convergence) to 1 (full conver-
gence). For any given choice of the ξAD parameter, the corresponding elements
of the variance-covariance matrix of the disturbances are given by:
σ2yi|PC = ξADσ
2
y|FC + (1− ξAD)σ2yi (6)
σyjyi|PC = ξADσyi|PCσyj |PC (7)
for all i, j, so that the correlation of shocks among countries is given by ξAD
itself.25
Full and partial convergence of aggregate supply disturbances are defined in
a similar way, with the convergence process now parameterized by ξAS .
Figure 8 reports, for the case λ = μ = 1 (the results are similar for all
other values of the policy parameter), the additional welfare loss entailed by
adopting the AEAMBR rather than the DEAMBR, as the degree of similarity of
supply- and demand-side shocks across countries increases (in the figure, the no-
convergence loss found in Section 5 is normalised to 100). With full convergence
of shocks, there remains virtually no scope at all for using the DEAMBR. This is
no surprise. However, a relatively high degree of (uniform) convergence is needed
before the loss associated with using the AEAMBR becomes relatively small.
Moreover, if convergence only occurs on the demand side of the economies, then
the additional welfare loss associated with the AEAMBR tends to linger rather
high.
We further investigated whether our results would be any diﬀerent if forward-
looking AEAMBR and DEAMBR were compared. Following Batini and Hal-
dane (1999), we require the policy-controlled interest rate to react to model-
consistent projections of future area-wide inflation and output gap, with the
degree of forward-lookingness varying between 1 and 4. The results deliver the
same message as above. With leads larger than 1, the underperformance of the
AEAMBR actually tends to be more pronounced than implied by the results in
Figure 3.
Finally, we repeated the experiments with a hybrid version of the model.26
With such model, the sub-performance of the AEAMBR is attenuated, but
does not necessarily vanish, particularly if the policy-maker attaches no weight
25 It would, of course, be possible to introduce the further complication that the speed
of convergence is not the same for all countries. For the sake of simplicity we ignore that
possibility. Let us just remark that our definition of partial convergence tends to make cross-
country heterogeneity disappear more smoothly than it would be possible.
26 Specifically, the hybrid model is such that: in the AS, currrent inflation reacts to both
past and future expected inflation; in the AD, the real interest rate is defined as the diﬀerence
between the nominal interest rate and average expected inflation four quarters ahead. The
model was estimated with GMM. Estimation details are available from the authors upon
request.
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to the volatility of the instrument. Furthermore, as in Adalid, Coenen, McAdam
and Siviero (2005), we find that rules computed with backward-looking models
are much more robust than the rules based on hybrid models. Hence, risk
aversion on the side of the policy-maker should advice to rather rely on the
results computed with the backward-looking models used throughout most of
this paper.
8 Concluding remarks: What implications for
euro area econometric modelling?
Heterogeneity of the economies participating in the euro area is not only statis-
tically detectable but, more importantly, economically relevant, suggesting that
euro-area monetary policymaking is likely to be more eﬀective if the econometric
tools used to support monetary policy decision-making are disaggregate, rather
than aggregate.
The diﬀerence in the welfare performance associated to the two competing
modelling strategies is sizeable, significant and robust along a number of di-
mensions, including, among others, the model estimation sample, parameter
uncertainty and the timing of the information to which the policy-maker reacts.
Only with sizeable convergence (of which there is no sign yet) our conclusions
would no longer apply.
Those conclusions are apparent in our simplified model for the three main
countries. Arguably they would be all the more supported if individual country
models were to pay closer attention to country-specific institutional features,
labor market arrangements, tax structures, etc., thereby presumably resulting
in a more pronounced degree of heterogeneity across individual country models.
Also, should the analysis be extended to cover more countries, this would most
likely further accentuate the welfare distance between the AEAMBR and the
DEAMBR. Moreover, the odds would turn even more unfavourable to aggre-
gate modelling if models were nonlinear.27 In light of these remarks, it seems
legitimate to conjecture that the increase in the welfare losses that we associate
to the AEAMBR is likely to provide a lower bound estimate.
All in all, the results make a clear case for relying on a multi-country mod-
elling approach when oﬀering advice in support of the single monetary policy,
and suggest that a line of research worth pursuing is a systematic investigation
of the aggregation bias (both its size and its nature) in euro-area macroeconomic
modelling.
27Hughes Hallett (2000).
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Table 1
ESTIMATE OF THE AEAM
Equation for:
Input from: π y
π 0.610
(0.077)
[-1]
0.390
(restr.)
[-4]
y 0.104
(0.038)
[0] 0.809
(0.054)
[-1]
r −.052
(0.022)
[-2]
R2 0.865 0.692
R
2
0.862 0.686
σ 0.289 0.483
DW 2.283 1.868
In parentheses: standard error of the coeﬃcients.
In brackets: lag with which the variables enter the equations.
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Table 2
ESTIMATE OF THE DEAM
Equations for: Germany Equations for: France Equations for: Italy
Input from: π y π y π y
π 0.292
(0.086)
[-1] 0.085
(restr.)
[0] 0.037
(restr.)
[0]
Germany 0.581
(0.066)
[-4]
y 0.091
(0.033)
[-1] 0.770
(0.058)
[-1] 0.113
(0.067)
[0]
r −0.076
(0.034)
[-2]
π 0.127
(restr.)
[0] 0.915
(0.049)
[-1]
y 0.021
(0.010)
[-2] 0.864
(0.047)
[-1]
France 0.021
(0.010)
[-3]
0.021
(0.010)
[-4]
0.021
(0.010)
[-5]
r −0.043
(0.014)
[-2]
π 0.963
(0.010)
[-1]
Italy y 0.065
(0.027)
[0] 0.697
(0.065)
[-1]
r −0.035
(0.014)
[-1]
R2 0.494 0.640 0.890 0.777 0.960 0.735
R
2
0.470 0.630 0.884 0.762 0.957 0.724
σ 0.393 0.730 0.335 0.412 0.261 0.470
DW 2.298 1.938 2.251 1.970 2.186 1.916
In parentheses: standard error of the coeﬃcients.
In brackets: lag with which the variables enter the equations.
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Table 3
OUT OF SAMPLE STABILITY, AEAM, 1998.Q1-2004.Q4
Equation F-value Tail probability
AS 0.91 56.59
AD 0.68 82.98
Table 4
OUT OF SAMPLE STABILITY, DEAM, 1998.Q1-2004.Q4
Equation F-value Tail probability
Germany AS 0.79 70.74
AD 0.51 99.23
France AS 1.13 34.13
AD 1.65 6.34
Italy AS 1.30 20.05
AD 0.58 91.35
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Table 5
AGGREGATION CRITERIA
DEAM AEAM
AGGREGATE SUPPLY
GG criterium 3.856 9.791
PPK criterium 0.225 0.289
AGGREGATE DEMAND
GG criterium 15.948 24.461
PPK criterium 0.449 0.482
GG : Grunfeld and Griliches (1960)
PPK: Pesaran, Pierse and Kumar (1989).
Table 6
RMSE OF N-STEP AHEAD ERRORS
(1998:1 2004:4)
DEAM Aggregate supply Aggregate demand
1 0.226 0.328
2 0.228 0.524
3 0.222 0.662
4 0.249 0.747
5 0.268 0.771
6 0.258 0.780
7 0.261 0.774
8 0.268 0.804
AEAM Aggregate supply Aggregate demand
1 0.237 0.340
2 0.242 0.560
3 0.241 0.719
4 0.261 0.808
5 0.277 0.845
6 0.275 0.866
7 0.298 0.878
8 0.305 0.916
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Table 7
DEAMBR 2.27 1.86 0.71 2.12 1.55 5.96
AEAMBR 1.56 1.39 0.72 2.44 1.36 6.69
DEAMBR 0.91 0.94 0.84 2.70 1.43 10.26
AEAMBR 0.67 0.71 0.83 3.25 1.26 12.08
DEAMBR 2.33 2.08 0.67 2.19 1.39 7.89
AEAMBR 1.56 1.58 0.67 2.66 1.22 9.08
DEAMBR 0.94 0.99 0.82 2.73 1.36 12.01
AEAMBR 0.67 0.76 0.81 3.43 1.20 14.49
DEAMBR 2.38 2.28 0.63 2.27 1.31 9.70
AEAMBR 1.57 1.75 0.63 2.89 1.15 11.46
DEAMBR 0.97 1.05 0.81 2.76 1.32 13.80
AEAMBR 0.68 0.81 0.80 3.62 1.16 17.02
Parameter values 
in the loss function: Type of rule
Reaction function coefficients and loss values for the AEAMBR and the DEAMBR
Annualised 
Inflation Output gap
Lagged 
interest rate
Loss
Coefficients on: Standard deviation of:
Annualised 
Inflation Output gap
λ = 0.1
λ = 1
λ = 2
μ=0.1
μ=1
μ=0.1
μ=1
μ=0.1
μ=1
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Figure 1
Note: For parameter definitions, see eq. (1) in the text.
RECURSIVE ESTIMATES OF AEAM COEFFICIENTS, 1998.Q1 – 2004.Q4
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Figure 2
Note: For parameter definitions, see eq. (2) in the text.
RECURSIVE ESTIMATES OF DEAM COEFFICIENTS, 1998.Q1 – 2004.Q4
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Figure 3
 
Percentage additional loss, AEAM-based rule vs. DEAM-based rule
(as a share of the additional loss with the DEAM-based rule vs. the loss with the FO rule)
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Figure 4
(c) μ=0.7 (d) μ=1.0
(a) μ=0.05 (b) μ=.35
Inflation - output gap optimal frontiers
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Note: Each curve shows the percentage increase in the loss function when the rule coefficients are moved away from their optimised values
 (corresponding to the points of minimum of each curve).
Coefficient of euro-area output gap
Coefficient of lagged interest rate
Figure 5
Fault tolerances of AEAMBR and DEAMBR
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Figure 6
Percentage of cases in which the DEAMBR outperforms the AEAMBR
Random drawing from distribution of estimated DEAM residuals,
DEAMBR vs. AEAMBR
Random drawings from distribution of estimated DEAM residuals
DEAMBR vs. AEAMBR
Testing the significance of the underperformance of the AEAMBR 
(value of the test; 1% critical value: 2.326)
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Figure 7
Testing the significance of the underperformance of the AEAMBR 
(tail probability)
Random drawings from distribution of estimated DEAM parameters,
DEAMBR vs. AEAMBR
Random drawings from distribution of estimated DEAM parameters,
DEAMBR vs. AEAMBR
Percentage of cases in which the DEAMBR outperforms the AEAMBR
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Figure 8
Effects of convergence of stocahstic shocks on the 
(Additional welfare loss, AEAMBR vs. DEAMBR; with gradual convergence of the stochastic processes
of AD and AS equations; λ=μ=1; the result for the case of no convergence is set = 100)
AEAMBR/DEAMBR comparison
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